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Abstract
Confucianism as a mode of life was brought to Taiwan as early as Chinese settlement. 
Regarding Confucian philosophy, however, it must be traced back to the founding of 
modern institutions. Even though the historical background of the Chinese diaspora after 
1949 is rather complex, it seems possible to examine how it has contributed to the devel-
opment of academic disciplines in Taiwan, especially with regard to Confucianism. The 
present paper investigates the corresponding contributions of two philosophers, Tang 
Junyi (1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan (1909–1995). Both are important scholars, who 
are indispensable for the development of contemporary intellectual history in Taiwan. In 
order to describe the creativity in their way of dealing with ruptures, of transforming the 
separation into the renovation of tradition, the author analyses their efforts in terms of 
geo-philosophy, through the lens of two concepts, dissemination and reterritorialization, 
that are borrowed from Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari.
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Diseminacija in reteritorializacija: Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan in preporod 
sodobne konfucijanske filozofije
Izvleček
Konfucianizem kot način življenja je prišel na Tajvan skupaj s prvimi kitajskimi priseljen-
ci. A konfucijanstvo kot filozofija se na Tajvanu pojavi šele v času oblikovanja modernih 
institucij. Četudi je zgodovinsko ozadje kitajske diaspore po letu 1949 precej kompleksno, 
je vendarle mogoče raziskati, na kakšen način je ta diaspora prispevala k oblikovanju taj-
vanskih akademskih disciplin in zlasti konfucijanske filozofije. Pričujoči članek raziskuje 
topogledni prispevek dveh filozofov, namreč Tang Junyija (1909–1978) in Mou Zongsana 
(1909–1995). Oba sta pomembna teoretika, ki sta igrala osrednjo vlogo v razvoju sodob-
ne kitajske filozofije. Za boljše razumevanje njune ustvarjalnosti in njunih prizadevanj 
za premostitev kulturnih diskontinuitet ter transformiranja ločnic v 
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preporod tradicije avtor njuna dela analizira skozi optiko konceptov, ki si ju je sposodil pri 
Jacquesu Derridaju, Gillesu Deleuzu in Felixu Guattariju, namreč konceptov diseminacije 
in reteritorializacije. 
Ključne besede: Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, tajvanska filozofija, konfucijanstvo, kulturna 
identiteta, diaspora
Introduction
Philosophy, pronounced in Mandarin zhe-xue or in Taiwanese Téh-Ha’eh, is ev-
idently different from the original Greek term of philo-sophia. The introduction 
of the philosophical discipline in Asia opened a new era of cultural encounter 
by way of translation; but it also encouraged modern Chinese thinkers to iden-
tify their own tradition of thoughts as “philosophical”, with an effort which 
is no less than an invention of tradition. The philosophical discourses in the 
modern Chinese language entail at the same time a double translation, that is, 
in an interlingual manner, from Greek, Latin, Arabic, German, French, and oth-
ers, sometimes via Japanese, into Chinese, and, in an intralingual manner, from 
Ancient to Modern Chinese. With its foreign origins, the term “philosophy” 
should be understood as enveloping a heterogeneous set of ideas in addressing 
Chinese thought. 
To speak of Taiwanese philosophy makes things more complicated. Because the 
choice of the term is not limited to the sole gesture of adding the adjective “Tai-
wanese”, but also involves historical and geographical deviation. Historically, the 
island of Formosa had its own indigenous people with Austronesian lineage who 
stayed primitive without a modern form of civilization until relatively recently. 
The first contact with the modern European world was through the short Span-
ish and Dutch colonies in the early 17th century. Despite some Han settlements 
in restricted areas, the Chinese regime really began in the late 17th century, first 
under Ming loyalist Cheng and then under the Manchu dynasty until 1895. Japan 
had sent expeditioners to occupy Chinese settlements on the island in the 16th 
century, but only settled it as a colony as a consequence of the Sino-Japanese war. 
The era of Japanese colonial rule demarcates the start of the modern period in 
Taiwan, with the same standards applied as in other parts of the Meiji Empire. 
It was only after World War II that Taiwan returned to Chinese rule. The year 
1949 is crucial here, as the Nationalist government was defeated in the civil war 
on the Mainland and retreated to its “temporary” capital of Taipei. A new iden-
tity was thus established through the coexistence of Chinese refugees from all 
Azijske_studije_2020_3_FINAL.indd   16 9. 09. 2020   13:21:10
17Asian Studies VIII (XXIV ), 3 (2020), pp. 15–33
provinces with the earlier Chinese arrivals along with the aboriginal population. 
Geographically, the island with, its Peng-hu archipelago, faces Fu-Jian province 
at the margin of the Pacific basin, part of a chain of islands with the Philippines 
in the south and Okinawa, Japan in the north. During the Cold War, Taiwan was 
seen as a key link in this chain to prevent the expansion of communism. Situated 
between the ocean and the continent, the island has long been a place of exchange, 
between the East and West, North and South. 
Due to its historical and geographical characteristics, the unique situation of Tai-
wan has affected philosophy on the island. As such, it would be better to see 
philosophy in Taiwan as a hybrid product of heterogeneous factors: the Chinese 
language as the dominant cultural identity, an American standard of academic 
activities, the Japanese influence imposing a colonial memory, as well as opening 
“a window to the world”, and European heritage as source of knowledge. Within 
this one can see ruptures and connections in the effort to integrate diverse tra-
ditions. Moreover, the resulting hybridity explains the mode of existence of this 
island in the contemporary world. 
Confucianism as a mode of life was brought into the island as early as the first 
Chinese settlement. But in a philosophical context it’s better traced to the estab-
lishment of modern institutions. Despite the complicated historical background, 
it seems possible to examine how the Chinese diaspora after 1949, as a geograph-
ical factor, has contributed to the discipline in Taiwan, especially with regard to 
Confucianism. Two philosophers in particular, Tang Junyi (1909–1978) and Mou 
Zongsan (1909–1995) are significant for the contemporary history of philosophy 
in Taiwan. In order to describe the creativity in their way of dealing with ruptures, 
of transforming the separation into the renovation of tradition, I will in this work 
examine their efforts with regard to geophilosophy with the use of two concepts, 
dissemination and reterritorialization, borrowed from Jacques Derrida, Gilles 
Deleuze, and Felix Guattari.
From Diaspora to Resettlement
As representatives of the second generation of contemporary Confucianism, the 
early years of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan were marked by the Sino-Japanese 
war and then Chinese civil war. Since the victory of Chinese Communist Party 
in the latter pushed them to leave their homeland, their philosophical testimonies 
are closely related to this catastrophe. Tang retreated to Hong Kong, a British 
colony at that time, and founded New Asia College with the renowned historian 
Chien Mu 錢穆. Mou spent a decade in Taiwan after his exile from the Mainland, 
Azijske_studije_2020_3_FINAL.indd   17 9. 09. 2020   13:21:10
18 Kuan-min HUANG: Dissemination and Reterritorialization
and then two decades in Hong Kong as colleague of Tang before returned to Tai-
pei in his last years. 
In his preface to Moral Idealism (1982b), Mou writes of these ruptures as cata-
strophic. In contrast to his sense of impotence when dealing with the political 
reality, he feels more power in engaging in a philosophical diagnosis of the intel-
lectual disease that he feels has befallen China in modern times. The big change 
from the Republican regime to the Communist one caused a personal trauma that 
required transformative self-therapy. Mou thus proposes restoring Confucianism, 
and recovering the lineage of the Dao 道統 that had been ruined in Communist 
China. By ascribing to this cultural ideal, his therapy is no less collective than it 
is personal. 
Mou’s academic reputation was established by such landmark works as Talent and 
Metaphysical Principle (1983), Substance of Mind and Substance of Nature (1981), 
Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (1980), and Buddha Nature and Prajñā 
(1997). Covering Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, the main problematic in 
Mou’s works is not a search for one interpretation of the history of Chinese phi-
losophy among many others, but a quasi-response to the problem of culture that 
Mou encountered in his times. The Kantian term “intellectual intuition”, referring 
to shared, core wisdom prevalent to all three doctrines, is not only used by Mou 
to criticize Kant, but also to reflect his personal feelings. Mou’s Autobiography at 
 Fifty, written around 1956–1957, is a testimony of his suffering from the fragmen-
tation of the individual, family, and country. He merges Kierkegaard’s “sickness 
unto death” (Mou 2015, 202, 210, 234) and Buddhist “Samadhi of commiseration” 
into an existential lapse out of nothingness and then confirms his “verification” of 
“the clear original mind”, of “the innate wisdom for enlightenment”, in short, the 
Confucian sense of Conscience, “Heavenly mind as the substance of benevolence” 
天心仁體 (ibid., 241, translation slightly modified). Mou thus searches for a re-
connection to Confucian resources to repair his sense of rupture. 
Tang’s view seems less catastrophic. His expression, “watching the immense sky at 
loss, crying with the wind” in the preface to The Spiritual Value of Chinese Culture 
(1979), is already a profound lamentation. However, without being pessimistic, 
Tang usually uses positive terms to encourage others, like him, in despair. His 
response to the turmoil he and China experienced lies in the analysis of the his-
torical and cultural problems that the country encountered. In contrast to the 
commonly held sense of crisis presented by Chinese intellectuals since the late 
19th century (Metzger 1977, 49), Tang represents a defence of the Confucian 
value system. Thomas Metzger later calls this specific attitude “epistemological 
optimism” (Metzger 2005, 259). But Thomas Fröhlich notes that “Tang’s modern 
Azijske_studije_2020_3_FINAL.indd   18 9. 09. 2020   13:21:10
19Asian Studies VIII (XXIV ), 3 (2020), pp. 15–33
Confucianism is not naively optimistic”, but “a substantial reconciliation of all 
inner contradictions in modern societies” (Fröhlich 2017, 67) A typical opinion 
can be seen in Reconstruction of Humanistic Spirit (1974): the suffering due to the 
various political shocks that China experienced is not limited to the political field, 
but also embraces the consequences of the cultural shocks that came with the 
arrival of Western modernity. His diagnosis leads to the recognition of cultural 
identity, particularly derived from Confucianism. The way forward is dialectical: 
one should admit one’s own evil and sin (the moment of in-itself ) in order to 
assume the other’s (the moment of for-the-other), so that the transformative sym-
pathy for self and the other could be rendered possible (the moment of for-itself ). 
The conflict produced from the encounter of Chinese culture with world culture 
is not a conflict between Good and Evil, but one between different aspects of the 
Good (Tang 1974, 274). Tang’s dialectics tries to conserve these various aspects 
of the Good to form a harmonious synthesis. The aim is to form a new cultural 
identity that is synthetically Chinese. The foundation of modern free and dem-
ocratic states lies on the political consciousness that can manage the dialectical 
relations among individuals, society, and the state. In Tang’s own language, it’s the 
humanistic spirit that can provide the foundation of values for humanity. This is 
Tang’s reply to the huge rupture that China suffered during his lifetime.
To make this more explicit, I will quote two of Tang’s famous metaphors: the 
dispersion of flowers and fruits (hua-guo piao-ling 花果飄零) and self-planting of 
the spiritual root (ling-gen zi-zhi 靈根自植). As a botanical metaphor, dispersion 
of flowers and fruits refers to the experience of exile: out of their homeland, the 
people live in a foreign place without a strong sense of integrity. Tang’s metaphor 
can describe himself living in Hong Kong under British colonial authority as well 
as others in exile either in Hong Kong, America or elsewhere. Feeling alienated is 
a common characteristic among such people, while the process of settling in a new 
place is a difficult one of recovery, both physical and psychological. “Self-planting 
of spiritual root” sketches the attempt to draw resources from this new land to 
wait for new shoots of growth.1 Being rooted, originally indicating the status of 
being at home,2 now means metonymically the conservation of value. Overcom-
ing the sense of despair and spiritual slavery, with this metaphor Tang encourages 
self-confidence and self-respect. Again, his dialectical reasoning deals with an 
issue of faith, a belief that just like in a man suffering a grave sickness there will 
appear in the hope for survival, or that with the heavy sense of guilt one feels there 
1 The relation of the root with the flower is usually taken as that of the past with the future (see 
Bachelard 1948, 291).
2 A root is a commonly used metaphor to indicate one’s home, but it also involves more complicated 
considerations (see Wampole 2016, 21).
Azijske_studije_2020_3_FINAL.indd   19 9. 09. 2020   13:21:10
20 Kuan-min HUANG: Dissemination and Reterritorialization
will appear a wish for the Ultimate Good (Tang 1975, 47). Out of the deep de-
spair that comes when facing extreme danger, there arises a strong desire and hope 
for life. The experience of encountering such limitations is a trial of faith, and thus 
the inner motivation for the self-planting of a spiritual root comes from the dia-
lectics of despair and hope. Tang not only keeps a religious tone similar to Mou’s, 
but also holds that the consciousness of value as the root that enables growth is 
based on Confucian faith. The hope to resettle oneself in a new environment is 
based on the belief that humanity itself is a universal ideal. This faith in humanity 
is for Tang the central idea of Confucianism.
Although both these philosophers defend Confucianism, they are by no means 
conservative, without any new contributions to this ancient doctrine. For Mou, 
being fully aware of the inner resistance of Chinese culture against the challenges 
of modernity (in the form of scientific knowledge and political systems), gives 
a transformative proposition to renew Confucianism. He admits the necessity 
of democracy and freedom to building new political institutions, and suggests a 
new model of politics in relation to morals. The direct connection of self-cultiva-
tion (nei-sheng 內聖) and outer ruling (wai-wang 外王), i.e. morality and politics, 
stated as a traditional model in The Great Learning, should now retain a radical 
dissociation by allowing an objective intervention, such as through science and 
democracy. Tang admits that China’s failure to develop democracy is due to cul-
tural reasons and the actual conditions of the country. His strategy is to mediate 
the contradictions caused by culture shock and to attune human efforts (including 
the desire for power or will to power) to moral values. In presupposing the conflict 
between politics and morality, he proposes a comprehensive theory of culture to 
find a balance. In the examples of Tang and Mou, we see the transformation of 
personal trauma into a cultural diagnosis in order to create the possibility of reviv-
al. The rupture caused by diaspora brings out the effort to reconnect the disrupted 
continuity. However tragic it was, the inscription of discontinuity may provide us 
with some clues to new thinking in the 21st century. We are thus in a position to 
consider their efforts to make a connection by way of their experience of rupture. 
This is the reason why I attempt to reposition this heritage left by Tang and Mou 
in the current work. 
Dissemination and Reterritorialization
One clue is the topological usage of the words “position” and “reposition”. The 
feeling of being “outlandish” (unheimisch) is attached to a certain place character-
ized by geographical difference. In the discourses of the two philosophers, what 
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is more evident is the historical interruption. There is a shift from emplacement 
to historicity.3 By looking back to the historical moments or reconstruction, Tang 
and Mou draw a picture of a future China, one contrary to their contemporary 
reality. Through this future ideal China is treated with a tone of hope. It is a 
mixture of the “ought to be” and the “will be”, of ideality and normativity. Seen in 
this way, the present moment in history is suspended by a rupture. This present 
is overlapped by a more authentic moment which can lead to curing the trauma 
and recovering integrity in the future, all in keeping conformity with the origin. 
This dialectical style of discourse can explain the momentary negative status. The 
remedy to this tremendous rupture is to rebuild a sense of unity, unity in and 
through history. It is exactly here that lies a discrepancy between the topological, 
geographical perspective and the temporal, historical perspective.
Potency of Difference in the Resettlement
For Tang, establishing cultural identity is key to healing the wound. All the con-
flicts are dialectically temporary and momentary, existing only for the present 
moment. In the long run, history will find a way to manage the huge rifts. The 
problem, for him, is to offer an image of One history with One orientation. This 
teleological speculation is called the “ideal of the public and the universal”. Tang 
uses the image of a river to assert this identity: “All the rivers in the world, wher-
ever they are, despite the curved fold, will necessarily be guided by gravity and 
flow into the immense sea” (Tang 1975, 51–52). It is understandable why Tang 
assimilates the suffering with the rift and tries to erase the locality (“wherever 
they are”) and particularity. Geographical heterogeneity is thus replaced by his-
torical identity.
But Tang himself offers another possible reading. The condition of the “self-plant-
ing of the spiritual root” is to keep one’s faith “in whatever environment”. Tang has 
in mind the absolute free will that is not to be conditioned by any place, any status, 
or any profession. The authentic man is the one who can hold self-determination 
and keep his own identity anywhere he goes. The expression “anywhere” is am-
bivalent. In one sense, it could mean that this person is detached from the present 
situation, as if he lived in a transcendental kingdom of freedom. In another sense, 
it could also mean that one should adapt oneself to the present environment. In 
the latter sense, the adaptation requires a realistic and particular understanding of 
3 In a Heideggerian conception of ek-stasis, historicity is essentially ecstatic (ek-static). The existential 
character of a historical being, such as the human Dasein, is constantly in a status of being out of 
place.
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one’s own present situation, hic et nunc. The topological condition for a real, ex-
isting person will not be easily cancelled. Otherwise, there is no reason to mourn 
for diaspora and the loss of one’s own home. On the one hand, the historicity 
manifests the condition of cultural identity that determines how one necessarily 
belongs to one’s cultural motherland. On the other hand, free will manifests the 
right and power of one to choose where to live. In the linkage of historical neces-
sity and geographical freedom, the antinomy of freedom and necessity finds a new 
form. In fact, for survival to be possible, for the revival to be hoped for, there must 
be a place for exiles to live in. 
This locus is significant for keeping the separation (between Communist China 
and free, Nationalist Taiwan or colonial Hong Kong, etc.), because it is the place 
where Tang’s hope can really be preserved. The New Asia College that Tang estab-
lished was the place where he spent the rest of his life working to expand his faith. 
This school is a new territory for the real settlement, so that the spiritual ideal can 
be located. Through this alternative reading, we can see that the self-planting of a 
spiritual root is in fact a replanting in a new territory. To exist anywhere will inev-
itably incur displacement. There is a condition of (re-)emplacement for thinking, 
for philosophizing. 
Dissemination, Borrowing Derrida 
In the cases of Tang and Mou, we have seen that the reconstruction of historical 
identity attempts to overcome the experience of rupture by returning to the ori-
gin. The challenge of modernity for Chinese culture calls for a correction to re-
spond to this challenge. Mou works out a genealogy of Confucianism to shape the 
authentic moral principle in order to prove the historical continuity descending 
from Confucius and Mencius, through Song-Ming neo-Confucianism, to con-
temporary New Confucianism. All the rifts lead to designating the obstacle of 
this continuity. Tang’s picture of neo-Confucianism is different, but still very sim-
ilar to Mou’s. However, the real problem is that these rifts could not be absorbed 
into one and the same history. There exists a certain supplement to this version 
of a single history. It could be argued that there are not only various versions of 
Chinese history, but also many “Chinese” histories, all depends on how one de-
fines the term “Chinese”. The semantic cross-section of “Chinese” and “Taiwan-
ese” leads to the same problem.
One possible way to shake the conviction that there is a continuous identity in 
conformity to the cultural origin is to adopt a perspective of heterogeneity and 
difference. My strategy is to point out the aspect of supplementary difference. In 
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his concept of différance, seen as “primordial supplementation”, Jacques Derrida 
evokes the “supplement of origin” (supplément d’origine) (Derrida 1967, 98; [1973, 
88]) to criticize the theory of representation in Edmund Husserl. In the phenom-
enology of time, Husserl conceives every moment as a living present (eine lebendi-
ge Gegenwart), which is the presence of the origin as repetition. But for Derrida, 
this presence is never integral, since every present is open for the moment to come 
and also pushed into the past. There is neither full presence of the origin nor its 
pure repetition. The incomplete presence requires a supplement, that is, some-
thing different from the origin. 
In his book Dissemination (1972 [1981]), Derrida evokes Nietzsche’s concept of 
contingence, derived from the experience of casting dice. He thus reformulates 
the concept of différance, as follows:
The present can only present itself as such by relating back to itself; it 
can only aver itself by severing itself, only reach itself if it breaches itself, 
(com)plying with itself in the angle, along a break [brisure] (…). Presence 
is never present. (ibid. 1972, 336; [1981, 302–3])
The non-identical presence shows the inner breach as fundamental reflexivity. 
The act of self-reference must involve a temporal duration. Derrida continues to 
ascribe this differing to the concept of history:
What holds for the present here also holds for “history”, “form”, the form 
of history, etc., along with all the significations that, in the language of 
metaphysics, are indissociable from the signification: “present”. (ibid. 
1972, 336; [1981, 303])
Self-identity always concerns a difference that postpones the closure of the self. 
Historical and cultural identity leaves space to the other, to the non-original. 
The difference offers another origin which splits, cuts, and breaks. Another origin 
will be a beginning for another new life. Derrida applies the logic of supplement 
to equate presence with life. The dynamics of spreading seeds or insemination are 
“the scission, the decision—which is both deciding and decided”, that is, “exit out 
of the ‘primitive’ mythical unity”. The dissemination is necessary because “Noth-
ing is complete in itself, and it can only be completed by what it lacks” (ibid. 1972, 
337; [1981, 304]). Différance or supplement can explain the diversification in life: 
no diversity, no life. The origin itself is plural. The supplement to the origin will 
not decide the consequent development. Ramification and blossoming will also 
mean diversification. To disseminate seeds, similar to casting dice, is to spread 
contingence. 
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Let’s go back to Tang’s metaphor of diaspora. When the seeds fall on the land, 
there is no voluntary decision, but rather arbitrary distribution. The dissemination 
is the product of contingence. It depends on the reception of the land. The diver-
sity of the places determines the new forms of life. The botanic metaphor of life 
resorts to the land as receptacle. The new territory makes possible the production 
of a new form of life. For life to continue, it requires the contingent emergence of 
different new forms, instead of repeating the old ones. Thus understood, Tang’s 
conservatism could reveal a rather different requirement for creating a new form 
of life in self-conservation (self-respect), without falling into the simple repetition 
of the old form from motherland. 
Reterritorialization: New Territory of Concepts
If it’s possible to borrow the concept of dissemination to induce the positive con-
dition of diaspora and resettlement, it’s also possible to consider the creativity of 
valuable life as another condition of thought. With regard to the ambivalence of 
Tang’s expression of “everywhere” (a sense of loss or sense of freedom), we have 
already clarified an alternative reading of his metaphor of self-conservation by 
introducing the topological condition. Yet the concept of place is not only instruc-
tive to notify the hidden presupposition of the origin, it confers a series of con-
cepts, such as home, place, territory, land, and earth, in philosophizing. To adopt 
the idea of geophilosophy, we can see how philosophy as conceptual creation in-
volves the territorial change. According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
work, What is Philosophy? (1991 [1994]), philosophical concepts emerge from the 
plane of immanence, which is not empirical:
it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philos-
ophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates 
its concepts. Both the creation of concepts and the instituting of the 
plane are required, like two wings or fins. (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 
44; [1994, 41])
A concept has its own claim by right (quid juris, en droit). The contingence of 
philosophical creation depends however on the land as territorial condition. 
Deleuze and Guattari hold that philosophical thinking by concepts “takes place 
in the relationship of territory and the earth” (ibid. 1991, 82; [1994, 85]). The 
primordial effect of geophilosophy is deterritorialization: “the earth constantly 
carries out a movement of deterritorialization on the spot, by which it goes 
beyond any territory: it is deterritorializing and deterritorialized” (ibid.). But 
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this movement working on the territory is never single ended. It is dynamic 
and constantly moving, so that the creation of the concept follows the track of 
this movement. At certain moments it arrives at some particular territories to 
“take place”, or using a Deleuzian term, to meet its plane of immanence on a 
certain land. The typical performance of this procedure is the Greek origin of 
philosophy.
Ancient Greece is the territory where the immanence of concept happens to take 
place. Deterritorialization accompanies reterritorialization:
Movements of deterritorialization are inseparable from territories that 
open onto an elsewhere; and the process of reterritorialization is insep-
arable from the earth, which restores territories. Territory and earth are 
two components with two zones of indiscernibility, deterritorialization 
(from territory to the earth) and reterritorialization (from earth to terri-
tory). (ibid.)
For Deleuze and Guattari, the origin of Western philosophy is contingent, due to 
“an encounter between the Greek milieu and the plane of immanence of thought” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 89; [1994, 93]). In contrast, the thinking that takes 
place in Chinese, Indian, Jewish and Islamic lands happens only through figures 
and not concepts; so Deleuze and Guattari take these thoughts as pre-philo-
sophical. After the period of Ancient Greece, the encounter happens for a second 
time in modern Europe. Curiously enough, a third time will perhaps arrive in the 
future:
The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth 
and people that do not yet exist. Europeanization does not constitute a 
becoming but merely the history of capitalism, which prevents the be-
coming of subjected peoples. (ibid. 1991, 104; [1994, 108])
Again, Nietzsche’s view of contingence and becoming prevails. If this formula is 
consistent, the process of becoming will not stop at a certain moment or a fixed 
place, such as modern Europe. The continuous becoming urges the creation of 
concepts to take place in the lands other than Europe, so that its consequence will 
be liable to go beyond Eurocentrism. Even at first sight, the judgment of being 
pre-philosophical seems to do injustice to Chinese, Indian and other traditions. 
The same injustice is suffered by Spain and Italy, as they are not included in this 
second moment of encounter due to lacking a philosophical milieu. In fact, the 
process of becoming will call forth a new moment of creation:
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Deterritorialization and reterritorialization meet in the double becoming. 
The Autochthon can hardly be distinguished from the stranger because 
the stranger becomes Autochthonous in the country of the other who is 
not, at the same time that the Autochthon becomes stranger to himself, 
his class, his nation, and his language (…). (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 
105; [1994, 110])
When the usage of certain concepts loses its freshness and creativity, there is a 
detachment from the plane of immanence. So there is a need to deterritorialize 
again. If the moment of strangeness falls on a certain land to project the plane 
again, then a new reterritorialization will occur.
This is the possibility to escape from the cliché about the legitimacy of Chinese (or 
Taiwanese) philosophy. Admittedly, there was no similar origin of philosophy in 
Asia as in Ancient Greece, but this does not hinder the invention of a philosoph-
ical tradition on the plane of immanence. However, I have no intention to project 
a new nation or new land. My aim will be only to open the space for transforming 
the topological significance in the botanic metaphor of diaspora and resettlement 
into a consideration of creative differentiation. 
Transvaluation of Conceptual Appropriation
Anyone who reads the work of Tang will admit that his metaphor aims to moti-
vate Chinese cultural identity. The geographical condition of rupture is inscribed 
in Tang’s philosophical argument. The ideal of correcting things is to clarify the 
Confucian humanistic spirit, by infusing axiological conservatism which incorpo-
rates the practical philosophy of self-respect based on free will. Tang’s argumen-
tation is in fact a mixture of Kant and Hegel, adapting the Hegelian dialectics in 
treating the historical coherence. 
Similarly, Mou’s Philosophy of History (1982a) obviously adapts a Hegelian frame-
work. But in this book, while distinguishing “analytical rational spirit” (fenjiede 
jinli jin-shen 分解的盡理精神), “synthetic rational spirit” (zonghede jinli  jingshen 
綜合的盡理精神), and “synthetic energetic spirit” (zonghede jinqi jingshen 綜
合的盡氣精神)4, he engages the Kantian distinction of analytic/synthetic and 
4 Because of the lack of comparable concepts in Western philosophy, the term qi is very difficult to 
translate into English. According to Margus Ott (2019, 321), qi is often translated as life-breath, 
even though it is not limited to animate beings. Many scholars also translate it as “matter” or “mate-
rial force”. However, qi can also pertain to immaterial spheres, and it is doubtful, on the other hand, 
whether there are any other forces as the material ones. According to the current understanding 
in physics, matter and energy are equivalent, and in order to avoid the term “matter” here, which 
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 rational/empirical. The terms, “extensional presentation” or “presentation con-
cerning the contents” of reason, have the trace of Aristotelian logic. In Mou’s 
old age, the emphasis lies on absorption and transformation of Kant. A pivotal 
expression appears in his critique of the “metaphysics of morals” of Kant, in or-
der to invent his own vocabulary “moral metaphysics” (Mou 1981, 136). As for 
the famous term “immanent transcendence”, arguably contested by Roger Ames, 
the aim is to state the proposition “the connection of heavenly principle with 
the moral nature (tian-dao xing-ming xiang-guan-tong 天道性命相貫通)”. Mou 
thus creates the term “onto-cosmology”. Mou’s final synthesis reconciles Chinese 
and Western philosophy through the path of Kant, reformulating a picture of 
the history of Chinese philosophy, as in Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy 
(1999) and Fourteen Lectures on the Convergence of Chinese and Western Philosophy 
(1996). Through his critical reading of Kant, Mou holds a Fichtean position and 
proposes a transvaluation of Chinese philosophy. Using intellectual intuition as 
the key concept to reach the Thing-in-Itself, Mou’s approach goes beyond the 
limit of knowledge set by Kant, for whom the metaphysical illusion is due to 
the dislocation of concepts of reason out of the realm of empirical knowledge. 
Mou’s usage of intellectual intuition is not epistemological but instead moral. 
This intellectual intuition, a synonym of the conscience (“innate moral knowing” 
liangzhi 良知), is seen as the foundation of moral metaphysics. But Mou’s am-
bition is not limited to the renaissance of Confucianism, it extends to Taoist and 
Buddhist philosophy. That’s why he terms his effort as a “convergence of Chinese 
and Western philosophy”.
The idea of convergence or reconciliation (hui-tong 會通) reflects the long-term 
effort of Asian intellectuals confronting the challenge of modernity. It presupposes 
a critical examination of philosophical traditions, a method borrowed from Tian-
Tai and Hua-Yen Buddhism, pan-jiao 判教. When a variety of Buddhist schools 
arrived China, the monks needed to classify the different doctrines in order to 
organize their knowledge and orient their faith. Mou adopts the same method 
and applies it to evaluate philosophy in general, by putting Western and Eastern 
thinking on the common ground. The Buddhist concept of Mahayana perfect 
teaching (yuan-jiao 圓教) offers him a model to evaluate philosophical systems. 
Even more than a mere borrowing, the Confucian version of perfect teaching can 
solve, as Jason Clower puts it, “one of the great problems of all philosophy gen-
erally, namely, whether and how a perfect person is also a happy person” (Clower 
2010, 181). Mou’s critical examination is thus analogous to deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization.
would again introduce hylemorphic thinking, Ott proposes simply using “energy” and “energetic”, 
instead.
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His deterritorialization is a way to extract the method of critical examination and 
ideal of perfect teaching from Buddhism. As a result of reterritorialization, the 
new territory is a complicated convergence of different systems of philosophy, 
those of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. A critical 
examination of philosophical systems allows Mou to open a field of discourse. A 
territory for the encounter of concepts renders possible the movement of think-
ing, of creating new concepts.
The question “How is intellectual intuition possible?” corresponds to Mou’s criti-
cal examination in response to Kant, in the sense that Mou affirms the “authentic 
self ” (Mou 1980, 181–83) to establish the fundamental ontology5 in a Chinese 
way. In so doing, Mou is still conscious of the common problem in Kant and 
Tian-Tai Buddhism, that of existence of phenomena. In the concession to the 
breach between the authentic self and phenomenal self, Mou tends to play a di-
alectical process to include the crack into the “constitutive and benevolent heart/
mind” or “authentic mind” (ben xin ren ti zhi yi qu 本心仁體之一曲) (cf. Billioud 
2012, 205). The cursive path (yi-qu 一曲) means in fact a negation and implies a 
dialectical way of thinking. Mou uses the term “retrospective verification” (ni jue 
ti zheng 逆覺體證) to indicate the self-negation of this authentic heart. To justify 
the moral presentation of such a dialectical connection (Mou 1980, 201–2), Mou 
resorts to intellectual intuition by maintaining the possibility of its inner negation, 
while the well-known expression “self-negation of the conscience” (liangzhi kan 
xian 良知坎陷) sounds nonetheless more problematic. The Tian-Tai Buddhist 
model of perfect teaching allows him to express a “cursive paradoxical wisdom” 
(quxian guijue de zhihui 曲線詭譎的智慧)6 (ibid., 322) that can dissolve the con-
tradiction in intellectual intuition. Starting with the Kantian problem, by way 
of Heideggerian fundamental ontology, admitting negation and paradox through 
the Buddhist model, and finally arriving at a justification of intellectual intuition 
as a value concept, Mou thus shows a sinuous process of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. 
In contrast with Mou’s interest in Tian-Tai Buddhism, Tang’s mode of thinking 
shows an affinity with Hua-yen Buddhism. Tang’s arrangement of nine horizons 
5 Though the term “fundamental ontology” is borrowed from Martin Heidegger, Mou surpasses 
Heidegger’s determination while ignoring the ontological difference between Being (Sein) and being 
(Seiende). Mou’s critique states that Heidegger commits a mistake of metaphysical misplacement 
(Mou 1980, 355). Mou argues that “the fundamental ontology can only be founded on fundamental 
mind (benxin 本心), mind of Dao (daoxin 道心), or authentic mind (zhenchangxin 真常心)” (ibid., 
347). Sébastien Billioud gives a profound discussion on the usage of fundamental ontology and ex-
tends it to a contrast between Mou Zongsan and Emmanuel Levinas (Billioud 2012, 139–60).
6 See also Mou’s expression “establishing the perfect teaching paradoxically” 詭譎地建立圓教 (Mou 
1997, 895, 1008–13). 
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(jing 境) also incarnates the critical examination of doctrines. Tang’s last book, 
Life Existence and Horizons of Mind (1986), represents an example of the sys-
tematic classification of doctrines. The first four horizons are set to explain the 
phenomenal world. The fifth concerns the abstract episteme, while the sixth deals 
with moral life in general (Moralität and Sittlichkeit). The last three horizons ar-
range three major religions in a successive order: Monotheism, Buddhism, and 
Confucianism. Putting Confucianism on the last horizon seems to be a result 
of the bias imposed by Tang’s faith. But in addition to the reason stated by Tang 
to praise the Confucianism ideal of humanistic common living, the last horizon 
reflects Tang’s search for cultural identity, which is his ultimate concern.
The intention of reorganizing the world as a value system is never a straight 
reductive arrangement for Tang. His cursive and complicated way lies in the re-
quest for a comprehensive understanding of the world full of heterogeneous val-
ues. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization involve a process of transvalua-
tion that also takes place in the interreligious dialogue. The pivot mechanism of 
the development of horizons stems from a traditional concept for gan-tong 感通 
(resonance, affective communication, empathy …) functioning in three directions 
(vertical, horizontal, successive) (Tang 1986, vol.1: 17). Behind Tang’s idealism 
there is a realist dimension, i.e. a topological condition, to motivate the interac-
tion of mind and horizon. Using the Hua-yen Buddhist terms and scope, Tang 
transforms the meaning of mind and horizon into a modern picture of the world, 
including science and ethico-political activities. Admittedly, his main purpose is 
to motivate a dialogue among religious values, and the ascription of each religion 
to its own horizon reflects his intention of converging the various aspects of the 
Good, without jumping into the trap of religious battles or competition among 
values. Tang also demarcates the line between philosophy and religion by setting 
a limit on the infinite regression. In so doing, he deterritorializes philosophy and 
religion at the same time; on the one hand, philosophy needs the orientation in 
values proposed by religion, on the other hand, religion needs the philosophical 
clarification to recognize its proper domain. The teaching (jiao 教), in the sense of 
cultivation, combines philosophy and religion together, so that Tang reterritorial-
izes these two again in the establishment of horizons.
The mind in Tang’s view is similar to Mou’s “constitutive and benevolent heart”, 
coloured by idealism. The horizons are for the mind to move in and out. Wher-
ever the mind might displace itself, there is always a topological requirement: to 
be in its own place, to be in the right place (ge-dang-qi-wei 各當其位). The place 
here means metaphorically a positioning of value. While enveloping the moral 
disposition, the mind shall reterritorialize itself in a certain horizon. Between 
right and wrong, higher and lower value, the mind decides in a dynamic way. The 
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concept projected by the mind guides this movement. This dynamic process con-
stitutes the way in which Tang conceives the world, after his suffering of exile. Re-
territorialization produces a new world, which is to be considered from a different 
perspective of horizon, place, space, and territory. The nine horizons can be taken 
as a transformation of the world through the matrix of dynamic resonance of af-
fection. The conceptual apparatus reflects his model of resettlement (self-planting 
of the spiritual root), but the new root is not a miniature of Hong Kong where 
he spends the rest of his life, nor an imaginary projection of a future world. The 
mind surpasses the threshold of Tang’s homeland and overarches the cultural ter-
ritories so that a mixture of world picture is forged. One moment of mental act 
can bring forth nine horizons. The movement circulating nine horizons is enfold-
ing and unfolding, enveloping and developing at the same moment. The physical 
space and distance can’t limit movement of the mind while the mind realizes the 
constant becoming. Being attached to the emplacement, the interaction between 
mind and horizon (the typical function of affective communication) responds 
to the becoming, which means the movement of thinking. Here the concept of 
becoming is a key moment to connect different traditions. The horizon (jing 境), 
a term originating from Buddhism, worked through the Confucian apparatus of 
affectivity based on the Book of Changes, seems to function as the plane of imma-
nence defined by Deleuze and Guattari. Tang’s conceptual manipulation has the 
potential to absorb the other systems and transform them into a new comprehen-
sive type. As a philosopher, Tang’s effort in establishing a comprehensive system 
of value can be considered as an effect of resettlement, of reterritorialization. 
Both Tang and Mou have appropriated the Buddhist model of critical exami-
nation to create new conditions of thinking. Such appropriation allows them to 
overcome the trauma of historical and geographical rupture. Their hope is to find 
a new possibility for the future. Since these conditions are topologically realized, 
in Hong Kong or Taiwan, their physical bodies create new connections with new 
lands. The places of resettlement are for them more like supplements to their 
homeland. But with the geographical separation (for example, due to the Taiwan 
Strait), there lies a zone of security to prevent these places from being absorbed, 
reduced, and forgotten. These unfamiliar, overseas islands reformulate a new im-
age different from old imaginings of their home country. Their effort in inter-
preting traditional doctrines affects all the younger generations. For good or for 
bad, Tang and Mou are paradigms that are representative of a generation strongly 
influenced by World War II and the Chinese civil war. Immersed in Chinese 
traditional resources, engaging in a cross-traditional dialogue, and creating new 
usage of philosophical terms, all these efforts form the heritage that we receive 
from Tang and Mou.
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Conclusion
The trauma that Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan experienced made them search 
for a way to confront history and overcome historical rupture. They thus ask for 
an original, healthy organism of culture based on Confucian values. In such a met-
onymic action, the idea of a personal cure is displaced by philosophical therapy, 
which is a self-transformation by restoring the vital energy. Their philosophizing 
involves a movement of thinking. The cure is actually not a pure return to the 
original, but rather a reconstruction. Mou constructs a fresh new origin of Chi-
nese metaphysics by using a Kantian term (intellectual intuition). Tang constructs 
a world (system of horizons) to reconcile the conflicts of modernity, of faiths, of 
East and West, and of nations. A new origin of Confucian humanism is also a 
result of construction. Instead of saying that the origin was already there, it would 
be better to confirm a regressive recognition. Philosophy is ascribed a metonymic 
function to activate an imagination of living dynamics, to metaphorically cure the 
living organism. In giving a new form of life, philosophy, in the hands of Tang 
and Mou, brings in something heterogeneous to the original organism. Not only 
some Western philosophers, but the whole tradition of Western philosophy is 
transplanted onto Chinese tradition. The recognition of origin takes place where 
there are different factors. Once the apparatus is triggered, the recognized origin 
should coexist with other origins. The die is cast, more than once, twice ... The 
dissemination transfers the possibilities upon various fragments of the earth. The 
experience of exile, seen as the effect of deterritorialization, is transformed into 
the motivation of the creation of concepts. Whatever their personal intentions 
may be, the movement of concepts becomes impersonal. Their efforts become 
part of the heritage of Taiwan and Hong Kong: a reterritorialization as a supple-
ment to origin.
The experience of thought in Tang and Mou is of course precious. The recrea-
tion of cultural identity must take into consideration the existence of historical 
rupture and geographical rift. This experience is in fact inscribed in the history 
to come, in the new world under reformation. There is a shift in perspective, and 
the supplement to origin displaces the standpoint by integrating a new framework 
to embrace the becoming of the world. Deterritorialization belongs to the world 
event. Without knowing Deleuze and Derrida as their contemporaries, Tang and 
Mou lived in and through their rifts, but this does not prevent their philosophical 
concepts from emerging from the same plane of immanence. The experiences of 
diaspora and thought can join together and find a new mark in world geography. 
The coexistence of philosophers from different places, from different generations, 
shows the possibility of forming a common world to live in together. In such a 
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world, the locality is never an abstract point in a system of coordination, but rather 
a constitutive factor for the integration of all the experiences. Locality sustains the 
effects of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Disseminative contingences 
enrich the diversity of all kinds of creation, especially to contribute to philosoph-
ical creation.
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